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Essays
Maintaining Incentives for Healthcare
Innovation: A Response to the FTC’s
Report on Follow-On Biologics
Christopher M. Holman*
ADDENDUM—CHRISTOPHER M. HOLMAN, MAY 2010
This article was written and accepted for publication prior
to the recent passage of health care reform legislation. At that
time, Congress was debating creation of an abbreviated marketing approval pathway for follow-on biologics (FOBs). Although there was broad support for the creation of some form of
abbreviated FOB approval pathway, the specific contours of the
proposed legislation proved to be quite contentious, resulting in
the introduction of multiple competing FOB bills in both houses
of Congress. The specific provisions of these bills varied dramatically. One of the bills in particular, House Bill 1427, was
strongly opposed by the biotechnology industry, which instead
supported the relatively pro-innovator House Bill 1548. By the
time this article was written, elements taken from these bills
had been merged into amendments to health-care reform legislation then pending in the House and the Senate.
Two of the most controversial aspects of the proposed FOB
pathways were the data exclusivity period (DEP) and the preapproval patent dispute resolution process (PPRP). In June
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2009, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published a report
recommending that Congress enact FOB legislation including a
relatively short DEP (e.g., five years as provided in House Bill
1427) and no PPRP (at that time all of the bills included a
PPRP, although the specific provisions of the processes varied
substantially between the bills). The FTC’s conclusion that a
longer DEP (e.g., twelve years as provided in House Bill 1548)
is unnecessary to adequately incentivize innovation in biologics
was based in part on a misapplication of the results of a study I
published in 2007 on the patent law’s written description requirement. I wrote the present article in late 2009 in response
to the FTC Report, explaining why I believe that the FTC overinterpreted the results of my study, and arguing in favor of a
longer DEP and inclusion of a fair and nondiscriminatory PPRP
in any FOB legislation enacted by Congress.
After the article was written and accepted for publication,
Congress enacted health care reform legislation, including the
FOB amendment pending in the Senate at the time this article
was written.1 For the moment at least, Congress has chosen not
to follow the FTC’s recommendations, and the FOB pathway
passed into law includes a twelve-year DEP and a PPRP. However, this in no way renders moot the issues relating to DEP
and PPRP addressed by the FTC Report and in this article. The
PPRP for conventional drugs, provided under the HatchWaxman Act, has been amended substantially since it was first
enacted, and history suggests that the same will likely hold
true for the recently enacted FOB PPRP.2 Expert panelists at a
recent meeting of biotechnology patent attorneys identified
numerous ambiguities and problems with the FOB PPRP that
will likely necessitate congressional intervention.3 There is already an active campaign to amend the statute to substantially
shorten the DEP for biologic innovators. Such an amendment is
supported not only by the FTC, but also the generic drug industry and others who believe a shorter DEP would bring down the
cost of biologics, including influential members of Congress

1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§§ 7001–7003, 124 Stat. 119, 804–22 (2010).
2. See Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the HatchWaxman Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 228–29 (2005).
3. Biotechnology Industry Organization IP Counsels Committee Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana (Apr. 19–21, 2010).
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(such as the sponsors of House Bill 1427).4 Thus, the analysis
and recommendations provided in this article remain highly relevant even after the passage of FOB legislation, as the focus
shifts from passage of the bill to proposals for amending the
legislation in a manner that lowers the cost of biologics without
unduly dampening the incentives for innovation.
I. Introduction .......................................................................... 758
II. FOB Legislation Should Provide an Extended Period of
Data Exclusivity for Innovators ..................................... 761
A. An Appropriate Period of Market Exclusivity for
Innovators Is Required to Incentivize Future
Innovation ................................................................ 762
B. An Extended Period of Data Exclusivity Will Not
Significantly Delay FOB Market Entry If the
FTC Is Correct in Its Assumption That Patents
Will Provide Extended De Facto Market
Exclusivity ................................................................ 765
C. The FTC’s Conclusion That Patents Will
Necessarily Provide a Sufficient Period of
Market Exclusivity for Biologic Innovators Is
Based on Ill-founded Assumptions.......................... 768
D. My Study of the Lilly Written Description
Requirement Does Not Support the Conclusion
That Effective Patent Protection Is Available for
Biologics ................................................................... 774
E. Ongoing Developments in Technology and Law
Pertaining to Biologics Could Challenge the
Ability of Biologic Innovators to Secure
Adequate Patent Protection .................................... 778
III. FOB Legislation Should Include a Fair and Balanced
Pre-Approval Patent Litigation Process ........................ 781
A. FOB Legislation Should Include a Fair and
Balanced Pre-Approval Patent Litigation
Process ...................................................................... 783
B. FOB Legislation Lacking a PPRP Would
Discriminate Against Companies Developing
Innovative Biologic Medicines ................................. 788
IV. An Exchange of Confidential Information Will Be
Necessary to Assess Infringement and Should Not

4. Victoria Colliver, New Rules on Generics Seen As Mixed Blessing, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Mar. 28, 2010, at D4.
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Create an Undue or Unique Risk of Collusion .............. 790
V. PPRP Provisions That Would Compel Innovators to
Identify and Assert Patents Prior to FOB Approval
Are Unnecessary, Discriminatory, and Would
Weaken Incentives for Innovation ................................. 792
A. Hatch-Waxman Strives to Balance the Interests
of Innovators and Generic Companies .................... 793
B. Some of the Proposed PPRP Provisions Deviate
Dramatically from the Balanced Approach
Embodied in Hatch-Waxman .................................. 795
VI. Conclusion .......................................................................... 800
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress is considering legislation that would create an
abbreviated Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval
process for follow-on biologics (FOBs), which proponents anticipate will promote competition and lower prices in the market
for biologic drugs.5 A key feature of such legislation would be
provisions allowing an FOB applicant to rely on data generated
by an innovator company to secure FDA approval to market an
FOB (also referred to as a “biosimilar”) in competition with the
innovator’s product. If the legislation works as planned, it will
appreciably lower the cost and risk associated with bringing an
FOB to market. Increased competition as a result of FOB approvals is predicted to bring about lower prices but, will also
result in loss of market share and price erosion for the innovator, and potentially, loss of consumer goodwill. This could effectively reduce the expected return on investment and thus the
incentive for investment in the development of this increasingly
important category of drugs.
There appears to be broad support for the creation of some
5. Biologics are essentially drugs produced in living cells, as exemplified
by recombinant therapeutic proteins. FOBs are often conceptualized as analogous to generic versions of biologic drugs, but due to the greater structural
complexity of biologics compared to conventional drugs, true generic versions
of biologic drugs are not anticipated any time soon. For a review of FOBs (also
referred to as biosimilars), and the economic considerations motivating the
push for legislation creating an abbreviated approval pathway for FOBs, see
FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC
DRUG
COMPETITION
3–24
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P083901biologicsreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC
REPORT].
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form of abbreviated pathway for FOBs, but much debate as to
the precise contours of the legislation. It is important that
changes in the law to promote FOB market entry also provide
adequate opportunity for biologic innovators to capture an appropriate level of return on investment, so that lower cost biologics do not come at the expense of future innovation and the
biologic drug pipeline.
In June 2009 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published a report on FOBs (“the FTC Report”), which attempts to
forecast the nature of competition between innovator biologics
and FOBs and offers a number of substantive recommendations
regarding specific provisions of the various FOB bills.6 In particular, the FTC Report concludes that there is essentially no
justification for the inclusion of a substantial data exclusivity
period (DEP) for innovators in pending FOB legislation, and
that Congress should not include a pre-approval patent dispute
resolution process (PPRP).7 The FTC Report bases its conclusion that a substantial DEP is unnecessary to adequately incentivize innovation in biologics in part on a misapplication of
the results of a study I conducted on the written description
doctrine of patent law.8
In this article I offer a response to some of the conclusions
and recommendations set forth in the FTC Report. In particular, I think it is important to clarify the scope and implications
of my study on the written description doctrine, and explain
why I believe that the FTC over-interpreted the results of the
study to arrive at a conclusion that is unsupported by the data.
As explained below, in my view an extended DEP for innovators is justified and should be included in FOB legislation
enacted by Congress. I also disagree with the FTC’s conclusion
that a PPRP is unnecessary and unwarranted for biologic
drugs; in my view, such a process is appropriate and would be
important for maintaining adequate incentives for innovation.
A fair and balanced PPRP would be especially important
should Congress follow the FTC’s suggestion to provide only a
relatively short DEP for biologic innovators. Some of the proposed FOB legislation would discriminate against the develop6. Id.
7. Id. at v–x.
8. Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A
Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the
Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Holman, Lilly].
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ers of innovative biologic drugs, not only with respect to FOB
producers, but also in comparison to the treatment currently
afforded conventional drug innovators. These discriminatory
provisions should be removed or rectified to provide a more balanced approach to promoting competition, while still maintaining adequate incentives for investment in biotechnology.
As I write this I am aware of and have reviewed multiple
FOB bills currently pending in Congress. House Bill 1548 provides a pathway that is relatively pro-innovator,9 and has been
generally supported by the biotechnology industry.10 House Bill
142711 and Senate Bill 72612 are essentially identical bills that
would attempt to speed FOB market entry by severely curtailing the intellectual property rights of biologic drug innovators;13 not surprisingly, these bills have been strongly opposed
by the biotechnology industry.14 More recently, FOB draft legislation has been reported in the form of amendments to currently-pending health care reform bills by the Committee on Energy and Commerce in the House, and the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) in the Senate (referred
to hereafter as the “House Amendment”15 and “Senate Amendment”16). The House and the Senate Amendments are based in
large part on elements taken from House Bill 1427, House Bill
1548, and, importantly, also on Senate Bill 169517 (an FOBs bill
which was reported by the Senate HELP Committee during the

9. H.R. 1548, 111th Cong. (2009).
10. Biologics and Biosimilars: Balancing Incentives for Innovation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 68 (2009) (statement of Jeffrey P. Kushan on behalf
of the Biotechnology Industry Organization).
11. H.R. 1427, 111th Cong. (2009).
12. S. 726, 111th Cong. (2009).
13. Since the House and Senate bills are essentially identical, I will simply refer to the House bill, H.R. 1427.
14. Biologics and Biosimilars: Balancing Incentives for Innovation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 65 (2009) (statement of Jeffrey P. Kushan on behalf
of the Biotechnology Industry Organization).
15. Eshoo-Inslee-Barton Amendment of 2009, H.R 3200, 111th Cong.
(2009) [hereinafter “House Amendment”] ( as passed by the House Energy and
Commerce Committee on July 31, 2009 by a vote of 47-11).
16. Hagan-Enzi-Hatch Amendment of 2009, H.R 3200, 111th Cong. (2009)
[hereinafter “Senate Amendment”] (as passed by the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee on July 13, 2009 by a vote of 16-7).
17. S. 1695, 110th Cong. (2008).
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110th Congress) — but each amendment also incorporates substantial differences, both in comparison with the originally filed
bills and with respect to each other.
II. FOB LEGISLATION SHOULD PROVIDE AN EXTENDED
PERIOD OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY FOR INNOVATORS
All of the FOB legislative proposals provide a DEP for innovators. During the DEP, FDA will not be permitted to approve any FOB through an abbreviated process relying on innovator-generated data submitted to FDA by the innovator in
order to gain marketing approval for the innovator’s approved
biologic drug.18 If FOB legislation works as planned, the ability
of an FOB applicant to rely on innovator-generated data will
substantially reduce the cost of bringing an FOB to market. It
is important to remember, however, that an FOB applicant
could choose to generate its own data and forgo the abbreviated
FOB pathway. The DEP would not prevent FDA approval in
this case because the FOB applicant would not be relying on
the data of the innovator.19 Furthermore, an FOB applicant relying on innovator data would not be required to wait until the
DEP has expired before applying for FDA approval. Under the
current proposals, an FOB applicant would be able to submit
an application relying on an innovator’s data, and the FDA
would be permitted to review and tentatively approve the application prior to the expiration of the DEP. Upon expiration of
the DEP, the FDA would make the approval effective.
House Bill 1427 would provide innovators a short five-year
DEP,20 while House Bill 1548 would provide a minimum of
twelve years of DEP, extendable up to 14.5 years for innovators
that conduct pediatric studies of the drug and gain approval for
a significant new use of the drug.21 The House and Senate
amendments both provide a twelve-year DEP extendable up to
twelve and a half years if pediatric studies are conducted.
The FTC Report argues in favor of a relatively short DEP,
less than twelve years, based on its conclusion that a twelveyear DEP will not be needed to incentivize adequate innovation

18. H.R. 1427, at § 3(a)(2).
19. Of course, there could be patent and other non-regulatory barriers
that would delay FOB market entry.
20. H.R. 1427, at § 3(a)(2).
21. H.R. 1548, 111th Cong. § 101(a)(2) (2009).
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in biologic drugs.22 A primary basis upon which FTC bases this
recommendation is its conclusion that strong and effective patent protection will be available for biologics, comparable to
that currently enjoyed by conventional small molecule drug innovators, thus obviating the role of data exclusivity in providing innovators with de facto market exclusivity.23
In this section, I point out that if the FTC is correct in its
assumption that patents will provide strong and effective protection for biologics, a 12-year DEP running concurrently with
a patent term will have little impact on the timing of FOB
market entry. However, it is far from clear that effective patent
protection will be available for all, or even most, biologic drugs,
in which case an extended DEP could prove critical in ensuring
that biologic innovators are able to maintain a sufficient period
of market exclusivity in order to adequately incentivize future
innovation.
A. AN APPROPRIATE PERIOD OF MARKET EXCLUSIVITY FOR
INNOVATORS IS REQUIRED TO INCENTIVIZE FUTURE INNOVATION
Bringing a new drug to market is a notoriously expensive
and risky endeavor, and the requisite investment of time and
capital will only occur in an environment that provides adequate incentives. Although grant funding plays some role at
early stages of discovery and development, the primary incentive driving drug innovation is the innovator’s expectation of
some period of market exclusivity in which to secure an adequate return on its investment. Market entry by generic versions of the drug dramatically drives down the price of the
drug, and inevitably the innovator’s profits as well. Competition by “me too” drugs in the same class can also reduce innovator profits, albeit usually to a lesser extent than true generic
competition.24 The optimal legal regime will balance the consumer’s interest in timely generic competition with the recognition that innovators must be allowed to benefit from an adequate period of marketing exclusivity during which they
compete only against other innovator products, if any, in order
to incentivize adequate investment to support the desired pipeline of future drug innovation.
22. See FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 44–46.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 12.
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As with any innovative technology, patents play an important role in providing market exclusivity for drug innovators.
However, drug innovators also face FDA regulatory barriers
that operate to delay market entry for first-in-class innovators
and subsequent competitors alike, placing drug originators on a
more or less equal footing.25 In the absence of an abbreviated
approval process, a competitor is required to generate all the
necessary clinical and nonclinical data to establish the safety
and efficacy of its product, which is very expensive.26 This expense is a potent barrier to market entry—one that the innovator invested heavily in overcoming. An abbreviated approval
pathway allows competitors to come onto the market without
incurring the full impact of this expense. Thus FOB manufacturers have the advantage of substantially lower market entry
costs. The significant role of regulatory barriers distinguishes
drugs from most other innovative products, and is one of the
reasons why competition and barriers to entry in the pharmaceutical market have been the subject of so much attention by
Congress and the FTC.
It is generally acknowledged that some substantial period
of market exclusivity for innovators is necessary to incentivize
an adequate level of investment in the development of new
drugs. This is particularly the case for biologics. However, the
actual duration of optimal market exclusivity has been hotly
debated. For example, in a 2008 study, Duke University economist Henry Grabowski calculated that it takes between 12.9
and 16.2 years on the market for a biologic innovator to “break
even.”27 In response, Alex Brill published a critique challenging
some of Professor Grabowski’s assumptions and estimating
that seven years of data exclusivity would be sufficient to maintain adequate incentives for biologics innovation.28 Likewise,
the FTC Report has criticized the numbers proposed by Grabowski, arguing that the model used to generate the numbers
“contains numerous methodological and conceptual weaknesses
25. Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate The
Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 509
(2007) [hereinafter Holman, Reverse Payments].
26. Id.
27. Henry Grabowski, Follow-On Biologics: Date Exclusivity and the Balance Between Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY
479, 486 (2008).
28. ALEX BRILL, PROPER DURATION OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY FOR GENERIC
BIOLOGICS:
A
CRITIQUE
10
(2008),
available
at
http://www.tevadc.com/Brill_Exclusivity_in_Biogenerics.pdf.
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that render its results too imprecise and non-robust to inform
discussions about the length of an exclusivity period.”29 On the
other hand, Vernon, Bennett and Golec, using contemporary
models of risk and return from finance literature, determined
that seventeen years of data exclusivity for new biologics are
required.30
One logical benchmark for setting the optimal period of
market exclusivity for biologic innovators is the actual period of
de facto market exclusivity currently afforded small molecule
drug innovators. A recent study showed that small molecule
drugs average eleven to thirteen years of de facto exclusivity
prior to generic competition, primarily as a result of patent protection that typically extends well beyond the short DEP provided under Hatch-Waxman.31 The general similarities between the research and development, regulatory approval
process, and market economics relating to the conventional
small molecule and biologic drugs would seem to warrant comparable protection. Although the FTC may be correct in its prediction that FOB competition will be less vigorous than generic
drug competition (at least initially), biologic drugs are also
more expensive and risky to develop and manufacture, and the
two factors to some extent offset each other. There has also
been a noted drop off in the approval of innovative conventional
drugs in recent years, suggesting that perhaps the current period of market exclusivity afforded small molecules might be
sub-optimal for incentivizing innovation. The FTC Report specifically acknowledges that conventional small molecule drugs
generally enjoy eleven to thirteen years of de facto exclusivity,
and never suggests that biologic innovators deserve less protection.32 Instead, the Report simply assumes that patent protection will be sufficient to provide biologics with a substantial period of de facto market exclusivity, thus rendering the DEP
superfluous, an assumption I challenge later in this article.33
In a related context, Congress has decided that conven-

29. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 45–46.
30. John A. Vernon et al., Exploration of Potential Economics of FollowOn Biologics and Implications for Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics, 16
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 55, 56–57, 71, 74 (2010).
31. See Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, 28 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 491, 493 (2007).
32. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 43–45.
33. Id.
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tional and biologic drug innovators should generally benefit
from the same period of de facto market exclusivity. Under
Hatch-Waxman, 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006), drug innovators are
permitted to extend patent protection for a drug in order to restore a portion of the patent life that is lost due to the time
spent obtaining FDA regulatory approval, up to a maximum of
fourteen years after the original FDA approval date of the innovator drug.34 This patent term restoration is available both
for conventional and biologic drugs, and the same fourteen-year
maximum period applies to both conventional and biologic
drugs.35
Similarly, the safe harbor from infringement liability provided by Hatch-Waxman for activities relating to the production and submission of data to FDA applies to both conventional and biologic drugs.36 This consistent treatment of biologic
and conventional drugs makes sense, in view of the similarities
in the development, regulation and economics involved, and
suggests that twelve to fourteen years of data exclusivity would
be appropriate since it would guarantee a de facto period of
market exclusivity for biologic innovators comparable to that
already enjoyed by conventional drug innovators. The FTC Report does not provide any compelling support for the creation of
a system that effectively discriminates against biologic innovators relative to conventional drug innovators.
B. AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY WILL NOT
SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY FOB MARKET ENTRY IF THE FTC IS
CORRECT IN ITS ASSUMPTION THAT PATENTS WILL PROVIDE
EXTENDED DE FACTO MARKET EXCLUSIVITY
The FTC Report predicts that strong and effective patent
protection will be available for biologics, comparable to that
currently enjoyed by small molecule drug innovators, and that
it “is likely that few, if any, biologic products will experience
FOB entry immediately upon expiration of a limited period of
exclusivity.”37 The FTC Report even goes so far as to predict
that patents will likely provide a longer period of de facto ex34. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006).
35. Id.
36. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006). For judicial decisions applying the safe
harbor provision, see Amgen, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 565 F.3d 846, 851
(Fed. Cir. 2009); Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1095
(N.D. Cal. 2006).
37. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 43.
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clusivity for biologics than currently enjoyed by small molecules.38 This prediction is based on the fact that the current
FOB legislation proposals do not include incentives for challenging innovator patents, a key feature of Hatch-Waxman.39
As explained below, for a variety of reasons it is by no
means clear that patents will be able to provide the extended
period of exclusivity predicted by the FTC. But let us assume,
for the sake of discussion, that the FTC is correct in its prediction that patents will provide effective protection for biologics
comparable to that currently enjoyed by conventional drug innovators. If that is the case, then an extended DEP will not
substantially extend the de facto period of market exclusivity
for innovative biologics. The DEP usually plays no role in extending the market exclusivity of small molecule drugs because
it has run out long before the relevant patents have expired. If
the FTC is correct and patents provide de facto exclusivity to
biologics for eleven to thirteen years, then a twelve- to fourteenyear DEP will provide little if any extension to the effective period of actual exclusivity. At times, the FTC Report apparently
fails to recognize that the DEP would run concurrently with the
patent term, and that the DEP only becomes relevant if and to
the extent it extends beyond the period in which patents preclude the entry of competition.
On the other hand, an extended DEP could prove crucial if
patents do not provide the effective protection for biologics predicted by the FTC. Even the FTC Report acknowledges that in
some cases, effective patent protection might not be available
for biologics, and that some biologic products may experience
FOB entry immediately upon expiration of a limited DEP.40 As
explained below, this might be the case even when a biologic is
expensive and risky to develop, and the product provides substantial clinical benefit to patients. Even if this scenario plays
out only rarely, a twelve-year DEP could provide important insurance for cases where effective patent protection is not available. There would be little downside to this because in cases in
which patents are effective, the DEP will have largely, if not
entirely, burned up by the time patents expire. The FTC Report
explicitly acknowledges that to the extent innovative biologics

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id at 43, 45.
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are not amenable to effective patent protection, an extended exclusivity period may be warranted.”41 Because an extended
DEP would only substantially increase de facto market exclusivity in cases where patents prove insufficient, the prudent
course would be to provide an extended DEP running concurrent with the patent term as insurance against those cases
where patents prove insufficient.
Furthermore, there are compelling advantages to relying
more heavily on data exclusivity instead of patent protection to
provide the optimal period of market exclusivity for biologic innovators. For example, by preventing market entry of FOB
products for twelve years, much wasteful patent litigation could
be avoided, since many of the key patents will no longer be an
issue by the time the DEP expires. An increased reliance on
DEPs could also provide critical incentives for the development
of potentially life-saving biologics that, for whatever reason, are
not amenable to effective patent protection.
One of the unfortunate consequences of the current heavy
emphasis on patent protection for incentivizing small molecule
drug innovation is that many potentially meritorious drug candidates are never developed if an innovator is unable to secure
effective patent protection for the molecule.42 In the past, biologic innovators have invested in the development of important new drugs even in the absence of strong patent protection,
relying on the regulatory barrier to market entry by competitors to justify the investment. In a post-FOB regime, biologic
innovators will likely be less inclined to invest in the development of products for which they are unable to secure strong, effective, and predictable patent protection. An extended period
of data exclusivity, however, could provide the needed assurance of a reasonable likelihood of recouping and profiting from
their investment. The requirements of patentability are such
that it is very possible that effective patent protection will not
be available for a pharmaceutically-useful biological molecule,
but the molecule nevertheless would make a substantial contribution to public health if developed and brought to market as
a drug.43 An extended period of data exclusivity would provide
an appropriate incentive to compensate for this limitation of

41. Id. at 45.
42. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standard of
Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 545 (2009).
43. Id.
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patent law.

C. THE FTC’S CONCLUSION THAT PATENTS WILL NECESSARILY
PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT PERIOD OF MARKET EXCLUSIVITY FOR
BIOLOGIC INNOVATORS IS BASED ON ILL-FOUNDED ASSUMPTIONS
Not all drug patents are created equal, and some have
proven much more effective than others in blocking market entry by a competing product. Composition-of-matter patents
claiming a drug active ingredient per se (“true COM patents”)
are by far the most effective, and are the gold standard for the
protection of conventional small molecule drugs. A true COM
patent is generally impervious to being designed around, because it effectively precludes others from producing or marketing any product comprising the patented active ingredient. In
addition, Hatch-Waxman requires a generic copy of a conventional drug to employ the same active ingredient as the referenced branded product.44 Even if a generic company develops a
new formulation of the drug, a new process for producing or delivering the drug, or if it seeks approval for a noninfringing
therapeutic use of the drug, it will normally be precluded from
market entry until the true COM patent has expired. Most
drug companies will only risk substantial investment in the development of a drug candidate if true COM patent protection is
available for the active ingredient. Small molecule active ingredients are usually novel chemical compositions eligible for true
COM patents that will generally withstand challenges to validity. For example, a recent market research report of generic
drug patent litigation prepared by Bernstein Global Wealth
Management (“the Bernstein Report”) reported that out of fourteen total patent challenges involving a true COM patent, nine
were won by the branded drug, three settled, and the generic
challenger only won twice.45
Other drug patents generally provide more attenuated protection for drug products, and experience has shown that small
molecule drug innovators are far less successful in asserting

44. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2006).
45. AARON GAL ET AL., BERNSTEIN GLOBAL WEALTH MGMT., PARAGRAPH
IV LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 6 (2007) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN
REPORT].

HOLMAN_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

MAINTAINING INCENTIVES

6/10/2010 2:51 PM

769

these patents against competitors than true COM patents. Examples of non-COM patents include patents directed towards
specific formulations of a drug active ingredient, specific combinations of active ingredients, methods of using the drug to
treat particular diseases, and processes and technologies used
in the production of the drug. The Bernstein Report, for example, found that of the twenty-three generic drug litigations
identified in the study that involved patents claiming active ingredient combinations, oral modified release formulations, and
first oral formulations, the branded company never prevailed in
court, while the generic challenger won thirteen of the cases,
and the other ten cases resulted in settlement agreements.46
In particular, patents covering the technology and
processes used to manufacture a drug tend to play an ancillary
role in the protection of conventional drugs relative to true
COM patents and even compared to other patents relating to
drug formulations or methods of using the drug. In fact, patents on processes and technologies used in drug protection are
not even listed in the Orange Book.47 The Bernstein Report
takes the position that although patents on the processes or
technologies relevant to a drug synthesis can be relevant on a
case-by-case basis, they are uncommon, and thus not even covered in the report.48
The FTC’s prediction that effective patent protection will
obviate the need for an extended DEP appears to be based
largely on an assumption that true COM patents claiming the
biologic drug’s active ingredient (i.e., the therapeutic recombinant protein) will prove just as effective for biologic innovators
as they have been for conventional drug innovators.49 However,
a review of the history of biologic patent enforcement reveals
that true COM patents have been much less effective in protecting biologic molecules.
The FTC Report acknowledges past instances in which
46. Id.
47. See OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., APPROVED DRUGS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS
(2010), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/eclink.cfm.
This publication, commonly known as the Orange Book, identifies drug products FDA has deemed both safe and effective.
48. BERNSTEIN REPORT, supra note 45, at 18.
49. For example, the FTC Report finds that “[t]here is no evidence that
the patents claiming the compound or molecule of pioneer biologic drugs have
been designed around more frequently than those claiming small-molecule
drug products.” FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 36.
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competitors have effectively designed around a biologic COM
patent, and provides two specific examples: 50 Genentech v.
Wellcome51 and Hormone Research Foundation, Inc. v. Genentech.52 Although these decisions are relatively old, dealing with
two of the earliest biologic drugs to enter the market (recombinant tissue plasminogen activator53 and human growth hormone,54 respectively), they are nevertheless instructive as to
the types of obstacles a biologic innovator could face in attempting to enforce a true COM patent against an FOB competitor.
In both cases, the alleged infringer produced a competing version of the same human protein, but with structural modifications, which effectively designed around the innovator’s patent.55
All of the proposed FOB legislation would permit an FOB
product to incorporate structural changes that distinguish it
from the innovator’s reference biologic product while still taking advantage of the abbreviated approval process and reference to innovator-generated data. Thus, in principle, an FOB
will be able to circumvent a patent covering the innovator’s
product while still benefiting from use of the innovator’s data.
The extent of the problem for biologic innovators will depend
upon a variety of factors, including the scope of patent protection available for biologics, the amenability of the innovator
molecule to structural changes that would avoid the patent
claim while retaining similar functionality, and the level of
stringency with which FDA applies its test for biosimilarity.56
In any event, it is wrong to assume that biologic innovators will
be able to successfully use COM patents to the same extent and
as effectively as conventional drug innovators have in the past.
After acknowledging instances where biologic COM patents
have been effectively designed around, the FTC Report asserts
50. Id. at 37 & n.152.
51. Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
52. Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
53. Wellcome, 29 F.3d at 1558–59.
54. Hormone Research, 904 F.2d at 1560.
55. See Wellcome, 29 F.3d at 1555; Hormone Research, 904 F.2d at 1560.
56. Under the proposed FOB legislation, the opportunity to rely on innovator data will only be available to an FOB that is “biosimilar” to the innovator biologic, see, e.g., H.R. 1427, 111th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2009), but it is uncertain how stringent FDA will be in determining biosimilarity.
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that in other cases COM patents have been successfully enforced against biologic competitors, and identifies six specific
cases purportedly supporting this proposition.57 In fact, however, four of the six cases are off-point and do not support the
FTC’s assertion.58 The two cases which support the FTC’s assertion are Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd.59 and
Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.60 Both are recent
district court decisions involving a family of related patents
claiming recombinant and/or therapeutic versions of erythropoietin.61 At the time this is being written, Amgen v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel has not been affirmed at the appellate level,
and the district court’s decision in Amgen v. F. Hoffman-La
Roche regarding the validity of the asserted COM claims was
recently vacated and remanded to the district court to consider
whether the COM claims are invalid for obviousness-type
double patenting.62 Notably, the FTC Report does not identify a
single appellate-level decision finding a true COM patent valid
and infringed by a biologic product. I have searched and been
unable to find such a decision. In any event, there is scant empirical evidence to support any inference that true COM patents are as effective in protecting biologic drugs as they are for
small molecule drugs.
Amgen’s recent success in enforcing its erythropoietin patents, at least at the district court level,63 is not typical. In
many cases, biologic innovators have been unable to achieve ef57. FTC Report, supra note 5, at 37 & n.153.
58. See Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (regarding an interference contest between two companies involving no assertion
of patent infringement); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (claiming a gene used in the production of the biologic, not the
biologic drug); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D.
Cal. 2008) ( involving patent validity and not addressing the issue of patent
infringement); Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (claiming the process for producing a biologic, not the biologic drug).
59. Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 160 (D.
Mass. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded by 580 F.3d 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
60. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D.
Mass. 2008).
61. F. Hoffman La-Roche, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 166–67; Hoechst Marion
Roussel, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
62. Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1386 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court’s judgment that the COM claims were
infringed).
63. F. Hoffman-La Roche, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 204, 229; Hoechst Marion
Roussel, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 210.
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fective true COM patent protection, often because the biologic
product is essentially a recombinant version of a naturally occurring human protein, and earlier isolation and characterization of the human protein has created prior art precluding
broad COM patent protection. This is normally not a problem
for small molecule innovators, who generally will not invest in
developing a molecule into a drug if there is prior art precluding true COM patent protection. For example, Amgen faced this
obstacle with respect to recombinant erythropoietin, but was
nonetheless able to obtain three COM patents limited to certain
specific therapeutic and recombinant versions of erythropoietin.64 It is also instructive to consider the difficulty Amgen has
experienced in attempting to enforce its limited COM patents.
In Amgen v. HMR, the asserted claims of two out of the three
COM patents were found to be invalid or not infringed.65 Only
after multiple appeals has Amgen apparently succeeded in convincing the court that one of its COM claims is valid and has
been infringed.66
Most innovators that have brought groundbreaking biologic drugs to market have not succeeded in using true COM patents to protect their products. In some cases, they have only
been able to secure patents claiming the processes and technologies used in the production of biologics, a more attenuated but
nonetheless sometimes successful approach to protecting their
product. In other cases, biologic innovators appear to have
brought products to market in the absence of any effective patent protection, as suggested by the fact that competing products sometimes enter the market without provoking any lawsuit by the innovator who first achieved regulatory approval for
the biologic product. In the absence of patent protection, these

64. U.S. Patent No. 5,547,933 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No.
5,621,080 (filed June 6, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,955,422 (filed Aug. 2, 1993).
Erythropoietin is a naturally occurring human protein that was isolated prior
to Amgen’s work, so patent protection on the purified protein per se was unavailable. See U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008 (filed Nov. 30, 1984) (summarizing
various methods of purifying erythropoietin developed prior to Amgen’s cloning of the gene encoding the protein).
65. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. 457 F.3d 1293, 1296–97
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
66. Hoechst Marion Roussel, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 210; Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A Survey
of the Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 329–30 (2007)
[hereinafter Holman, Impact].
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products would likely not be developed in a post-FOB world unless Congress provides a DEP of sufficient duration.
One of the most common means by which biologic innovators have attempted to secure patent positions on their products is by patenting the genes, genetic constructs, and recombinant cells used in the production of the biologic, as well as the
processes themselves. In some cases, these patents have been
deployed successfully (for simplicity, I will refer generally to
these patents as “gene patents,” since they are based on the
gene encoding the biologic rather than the biologic itself). Amgen has been particularly successful in using gene patents to
block market entry by competitors in the market for recombinant erythropoietin.67 However, there are also numerous examples where competitors have successfully designed around
an innovator’s gene patents and brought a competing biologic to
market while avoiding infringement liability.68 The FTC acknowledges that the ability of drug competitors to design
around non-COM patents is “prevalent,”69 a crucial concession
when one recognizes that effective true COM patent protection
has in the past often not been available for biologic innovators
and that it is unclear whether things will change to render
such protection more available in the future. Notably, the FTC
Report fails to identify any basis for which to predict that true
COM patent protection will be more available in the future
than it has been to date.
Another serious limitation facing biologic innovators relying on patents directed solely toward technologies used in the
67. Id.
68. Christopher M. Holman, Learning from Litigation: What Can Lawsuits Teach Us About the Role of Human Gene Patents in Research and Innovation?, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 215, 223–29 (2009) [hereinafter Holman,
Learning]. Examples include: Genzyme, Corp. v. Transkaryotic Therapies,
Inc., 346 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that claims broadly reciting methods for recombinant production of human α-galactosidase A were not infringed by a method employing gene activation technology); Biogen, Inc. v.
Berlex Lab., Inc., 318 F.3d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that claims to cells
that have been genetically engineered to express the human interferon gene
were not literally infringed by cells produced using alternate transformation
method); Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that a patent claiming a naturally occurring interferon gene was not infringed by consensus interferon product); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that a patent on an insulin
gene was circumvented by expressing protein as a fusion); Novo Nordisk of N.
Am., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 77 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding an apparently broad gene patent circumvented by the use of protein fusion technology).
69. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 45.
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production of the product is that these patents are potentially
susceptible to circumvention by a competitor who produces the
product outside the United States in a jurisdiction where the
innovator has not patented the technology, or where enforcement is more difficult.70 This could be an especially important
issue if FOB production shifts to countries such as China and
India, as some have predicted.

D. MY STUDY OF THE LILLY WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
REQUIREMENT DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT
EFFECTIVE PATENT PROTECTION IS AVAILABLE FOR BIOLOGICS
In concluding that effective patent protection is currently
available for biologics, the FTC Report relies in part on the results of an empirical study on the Lilly written description requirement (LWD) that I published in 2007.71 However, the FTC
over-interpreted the results of my study to arrive at a conclusion that I never stated, and which does not find support in the
data.
In considering the implications of my study, it is important
to bear in mind the context from which my article arose. LWD
is a distinct form of the written description doctrine which
traces its origin to the Federal Circuit’s 1997 Regents of the
University of California v. Eli Lilly decision.72 Prior to 2007
there was a widespread perception, particularly among academics, that LWD functioned as a “super-enablement” requirement that effectively limited inventors of novel biomolecules (particularly DNA and proteins) to a single sequence, or a
limited number of specifically recited sequences, resulting in an
extremely narrow scope of patent protection for biotechnology
inventions.73 I conducted a search to identify all decisions in
the federal courts and in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) which
had applied LWD. My central conclusions were that: (1) LWD
was generally not functioning as a super-enablement require70. Holman, Learning, supra note 68, at 229–31.
71. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 36–37 n.151 (citing Holman, Lilly, supra note 8, at 47).
72. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566–67
(Fed. Cir.1997).
73. See Holman, Lilly, supra note 8, at 17.
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ment, but rather was applied in a manner that effectively rendered LWD redundant with the enablement requirement; (2)
neither the courts nor the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
had formulated a coherent interpretation of LWD that provided
any meaningful limitation on claim scope that could not better
be achieved by means of the enablement requirement; and (3)
LWD was not restricting inventors to claims encompassing only
a small number of sequences; rather, inventors were successfully obtaining and enforcing patent claims encompassing large
numbers of variants of a disclosed invention, including newly
discovered DNA sequences and proteins.74
Based on the findings of my study, the FTC Report concludes that since genus claims encompassing large numbers of
variations on a disclosed DNA or protein sequence have survived challenges based on LWD, it must be the case that biologics are adequately protected by patents.75 However, this conclusion is not supported by my article. The FTC Report fails to
appreciate that the potential for a patent to effectively block
market entry by a competing biologic is not merely a function of
claim scope per se, but depends critically on the extent to which
the structure of the claimed molecule can be altered while retaining substantial functionality. Even a patent that in absolute terms covers a large number of variants will be ineffective
in blocking FOB competition if it does not encompass all biosimilar variations of the reference product that could take advantage of the abbreviated FOB pathway to market. I never addressed this issue in my article, and never suggested that my
findings supported a conclusion that the scope of patent protection available for biologics would be sufficient to encompass any
biosimilar variation of an innovator’s molecule.
Although my article identified numerous judicial decisions
involving LWD, only two of these decisions involved an infringement lawsuit brought against the manufacture of a biologic. One of these was Regents of the University of California
v. Eli Lilly (namesake of Lilly written description), in which the
Federal Circuit applied LWD to invalidate the university’s patent claiming the human insulin gene.76 The other was Amgen
v. HMR,77 in which the court sided with the patent owner and

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 78–82.
See FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 37–38.
Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568–69.
See supra note 65–67 and accompanying text.
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rejected the LWD-based validity challenge raised by the alleged
infringer.78 However, in that case the LWD challenge was directed specifically at claims reciting recombinant cells, not
biomolecules (i.e., the actual biologic or the DNA encoding it),
so the decision is not directly relevant to the question of whether patent claims broadly encompassing variations of a biologic
or the DNA sequence encoding it, would survive a LWD-based
challenge.79 The FTC Report specifically focuses on the availability of protein “percent identity claims” to protect biologics,80
but my research has been unable to identify a single example of
such a patent claim that has been successfully enforced against
a biologic competitor.
Perhaps more importantly, there have been significant legal developments affecting LWD since the publication of my
2007 article that could dramatically impact the ability of biologic innovators to obtain effective scope of patent coverage. Prior
to 2007, my study showed that for the most part the PTO had
applied LWD in a manner effectively redundant with the
enablement requirement.81 When patent examiners attempted
to use LWD as a super-enablement requirement to limit the
scope of biologic claims, they were generally reversed on appeal
by the BPAI.82 However, in 2008 the PTO issued revised written description guidelines that in some respects contradict official PTO policy reflected in the original written description
guidelines that had been in effect since 1999.83 The revised
guidelines apply LWD to biotechnology inventions in a manner
that imposes substantial limitations on claim scope in a manner that is distinct, and in some respects more restrictive, than
the limitations imposed by the enablement requirement.84 This

78. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330–34
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
79. Id.
80. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 36–37.
81. Holman, Lilly, supra note 8, at 71.
82. Id. at 78–79.
83. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
TRAINING
MATERIALS
13–14
(2008),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/written.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, REVISED INTERIM DESCRIPTION GUIDELINES TRAINING MATERIALS 27–
29 (1999), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/writtendesc.pdf .
84. Christopher Holman, PTO Issues Revised Written Description Guidelines, Further Muddying the Waters, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH IP BLOG (Apr. 24,
2008, 4:01 PM), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2008/04/pto-issues-
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applies particularly to protein percent identity claims of the
type the FTC Report identifies as amenable to broad claim coverage. Anecdotally, it also appears that the PTO has started to
apply LWD more aggressively as a super-enablement requirement to claims on biomolecules. As a result, the broad seventy
percent identity claims identified in the FTC Report are probably no longer available to most patent applicants, who will be
forced to settle for a significantly narrower range of protection,
ninety-five percent or greater in most cases.85
A good example of this is the recent trend towards more
stringent application of LWD to limit biomolecule claim scope
can be seen in Ex parte Kubin, a recent BPAI decision that affirmed an examiner’s rejection of claims reciting DNA molecules encoding proteins sharing eighty percent identity with a
segment of a disclosed protein, and retaining the function of the
disclosed reference protein. 86 According to the PTO, even
though the applicant had enabled the genus of molecules encompassed by the claim, the claim failed to comply with LWD
for failing to adequately identify which molecules sharing eighty percent or greater sequence identity retained the function of
the reference molecule.87 This is a sharp departure from earlier
BPAI decisions upon which I based the findings of my article.88
Kubin signals that in the future, inventions relating to biologic
drugs may be afforded substantially narrower patent protection
than they have in the past, undercutting the FTC’s assumption
that broad patent protection will be available for biologics.
Quite recently, the Federal Circuit agreed to reconsider the
doctrine of LWD en banc,89 and it is possible the court will curtail, or perhaps even jettison LWD. But for the time being LWD
appears to be playing an increasing role in restricting the scope
of issued patent claims relating to biomolecules, and it could also implicate the validity and scope of issued patents relating to
biologics. It is also important to remember that my article was
focused entirely on LWD, and there are a variety of other patent doctrines that could also substantially limit the ability of
biologic innovators to secure broad patent protection capable of
revised-written-description.html.
85. Based on conversations with patent attorneys working in this area.
86. Ex Parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410, 1412, 1417 (B.P.A.I. 2007).
87. Id. at 1414.
88. Holman, Lilly, supra note 8, at 42–57.
89. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 332 Fed. App’x 636, 637 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
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encompassing potential FOB products. In particular, even if the
Federal Circuit decides to eliminate LWD, the enablement requirement will still serve to limit the scope of protection available to biologic innovators. In recent years, there has been a
renewed emphasis in the courts on the use of the enablement
requirement to limit claim scope.90
E. ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY AND LAW
PERTAINING TO BIOLOGICS COULD CHALLENGE THE ABILITY OF
BIOLOGIC INNOVATORS TO SECURE ADEQUATE PATENT
PROTECTION
Although the past experiences of small molecule and biologic innovators in using patents to maintain market exclusivity is informative, there are significant caveats that should not
be forgotten. These include the changing nature of biologic
drugs, uncertainty as to how far an FOB will be permitted to
deviate in structure from a reference biologic while still maintaining sufficient biosimilarity to benefit from an abbreviated
FOB approval process, and ongoing (and at times dramatic) developments in patent law. Historically, most biologic drugs
were essentially just recombinant versions of naturally existing
human proteins (first-generation human proteins). However,
the trend in biologics is towards extensively engineered variants of naturally occurring proteins (second-generation human proteins) and therapeutic monoclonal antibodies. Past experience with the use of patents to protect first-generation human proteins will be of only limited use in predicting the ability
of patents to adequately protect more recent and yet-to-bedeveloped biologic drugs.
For example, the nonobviousness requirement91 could substantially limit the ability of biologic innovators to effectively
patent engineered variants of previously known human proteins. Prior art disclosing the naturally occurring protein and
the gene encoding the protein, combined with known methodologies for structurally engineering proteins to improve or modify
function, could render a second-generation human protein obvious under the patent laws, even if the product would be ex90. See, e.g., Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244
(Fed. Cir. 2008); Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
91. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
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tremely expensive to bring to market and would provide patients with substantial benefit. Historically, it has been generally thought that the nonobviousness doctrine imposes a relatively low barrier to the patenting of newly isolated genetic
sequences and other biotechnology-related inventions. However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in KSR v. Teleflex92 has
apparently raised the nonobviousness bar to patentability, and
in its wake, pharmaceutical patent claims have been invalidated that would likely have survived and obviousness challenge pre-KSR.93
The Federal Circuit recently affirmed a PTO obviousnessbased rejection of claims directed to a novel genetic sequence of
therapeutic relevance, signaling that in the future patents relating to biologics will face a more stringent interpretation of
the nonobviousness doctrine than in the past.94 Rapid developments in molecular biology are constantly creating new prior
art that could be combined by a patent examiner or court to establish the obviousness of an invention. In tandem, the accumulation of prior art as technology advances and more stringent application of the nonobviousness requirement could
substantially restrict the availability of adequate patent protection for the innovative biologic drugs of the future.
To date, monoclonal antibodies have generally been afforded relatively broad patent protection, and recently a jury
found a COM patent claiming a monoclonal antibody infringed
by Abbott’s biologic product adalimumab (HUMIRA).95 However, again, there is a concern that the rapidly expanding prior
art in this area, combined with a more stringent application of
the nonobviousness doctrine, could preclude innovators from
securing adequate patent protection on monoclonal antibodies,
such as a monoclonal antibody directed against an antigen
known in the prior art. Furthermore, although the PTO and
courts have up until this point applied LWD and enablement
requirements less stringently to monoclonal antibodies than

92. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
93. See Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Barr Lab., Inc., 575 F.3d 1341 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (affirming based on the obviousness standard articulated in KSR);
Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 571, 584–87 (D. Conn.
2008) (invalidating claims based on the obviousness standard from KSR).
94. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (declining to
adopt a narrow interpretation of KSR).
95. Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 669 F. Supp. 2d 756,
759–60, 773 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
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other biomolecules, both doctrines are in flux, particularly
LWD, and it is by no means certain that broad patent protection will be available to FOB variants of this increasingly important class of biologics.
Some of the early biologic drugs were able to benefit from
an extended term of patent protection because the patent applications were filed at a time when patents enjoyed a seventeenyear term beginning on the date the patent issued. The law was
changed in 1995, and subsequently filed patent applications result in patents which expire twenty years after the date the initial priority application was filed. Patents that were in force, or
pending, when the law was changed were afforded a term that
is measured as the longer of twenty years from the priority
date or seventeen years from the date of issue. Amgen, for example, holds several patents relating to its erythropoietin
products which fall into this in-between category.96 This is yet
another reason to question whether future biologic innovators
will be able to employ patents as effectively as has been the
case for the pioneering biologic products.
Some biologic innovators not only benefited from a patent
term of seventeen years from time of issuance, but also from
continuation or divisional patent applications which were pending on June 6, 1995 (the date the change in law became effective). Patents issuing from these applications are entitled to a
term significantly longer than twenty years from their priority
date. Today, there are probably very few instances of patents
issuing from applications that were filed before the effective
date more than fourteen years ago, and it is safe to assume that
new biologics coming to market will not enjoy patent protection
beyond twenty years from the patent application’s initial filing
date. Nevertheless, biologics companies today continue to rely
heavily on continuation applications in attempts to obtain more
robust (albeit not longer) patent coverage for their developmental products.
In order to manage its workload, the PTO recently sought
to institute changes that would substantially limit the ability of
biologics companies to use continuation applications in this
manner.97 Those changes have been challenged in the courts

96. Holman, Impact, supra note 66, at 327.
97. See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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and are currently on hold,98 but it is too early to know whether
some limitation on continuation practice might be instituted at
some point, which could further limit the ability of drug companies to obtain effective patent protection.
The FTC Report argues that an extended DEP is not warranted because it predicts innovators will use citizen’s petitions
and other non-patent tactics to block market entry by the
FOB.99 But under the FOB legislative proposals currently being
considered, the FOB applicant is allowed to apply for regulatory approval years before the expiration of the data exclusivity
period, and during this time FDA should be able to address legitimate citizen’s petitions and the like, while denying those
that are mere pretense used as a delaying tactic. If a problem
exists with abuse of the citizen’s petition process, that issue
should be addressed by Congress and/or FDA, and not used as
an excuse to deny biologic innovators a reasonable period of
market exclusivity.
III. FOB LEGISLATION SHOULD INCLUDE A FAIR AND
BALANCED PRE-APPROVAL PATENT LITIGATION
PROCESS
Despite the FTC’s June 2009 recommendations, all of the
pending FOB legislative proposals (House Bill 1548, House Bill
1427, Senate Bill 726, and the House and Senate Amendments)
include some variation of a pre-approval patent resolution
process (PPRP),100 each more or less distantly related to the
PPRP provided under Hatch-Waxman for small molecule drugs
(often referred to as “Paragraph IV” litigations).101 However,
the FTC Report recommends against the creation of a PPRP for
biologics, based in large part on its conclusion that: (1) the primary justification for the inclusion of a PPRP for small molecule drugs in the Hatch-Waxman Act was a concern that generic companies would be underfunded and effectively judgmentproof, but that this rationale will not apply to the more established biotechnology companies that the FTC predicts will be
the primary developers of FOBs;102 and (2) provisions for pro-

98. Id. at 1359–62.
99. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 43.
100. See supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text.
101. The Hatch-Waxman PPRP is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006)
and 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (West 1999 & Supp. 2009).
102. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 47–48, 57–59.
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tecting the confidentiality of information exchanged between
the innovator and FOB applicant are insufficient, and the exchange of information could facilitate anticompetitive collusion
between competitors.103 In this section, I address both of these
issues, and explain why a PPRP is important and justified for
biologic innovators.
As an initial matter, it should be noted that the importance
of a PPRP is directly correlated with the length of a DEP provided to biologic innovators. A twelve- to fourteen-year DEP, for
example, would deemphasize the role of patents in protecting
biologics and consequently render the availability of a PPRP
less critical. However, if Congress provides only a short DEP,
such as proposed under House Bill 1427,104 a PPRP could prove
crucial in order to ensure biologic innovators an adequate opportunity to effectively enforce their patents. It should also be
stressed that any PPRP should not discriminate against biologic innovators, either with respect to FOB applicants, or in comparison with the rights afforded small molecule drug innovators.
According to the FTC, the PPRP for small molecule drugs
was originally included in the Hatch-Waxman Act primarily for
the purpose of protecting innovators from the possibility of
judgment-proof generic infringers.105The FTC forecasts that
this will not be a problem in the context of FOBs, based on an
assumption that the damages resulting from infringement will
be less than in the case of small molecule drugs, and because
FOB manufacturers will be better funded and able to satisfy a
substantial judgment.106 However, it is not entirely clear that
infringement by an FOB will result in substantially less lost
profits to biologic innovators than infringement by generic
drugs cause for conventional drugs. Biologics are generally
much more expensive to develop and produce than conventional
drugs, and at this point it is hard to say to what extent damages would accrue based on market entry by an FOB later found
to be infringing, particularly if the judgment of infringement
does not occur until years after the FOB has entered the market. It is also unclear that FOB manufacturers will be in a sub-

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 57–59.
H.R. 1427, 111th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2009).
FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 47–48.
See id. at 53.
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stantially better position to pay a larger award of damages
than conventional generic drug companies. For example, economist Robert Shapiro recently published a report predicting
that an FOB pathway for biologic drugs will result in huge savings for U.S. consumers, based in large part on his assumption
that the production of biologic drugs will shift to low-cost countries such as China and India.107 Leaving aside the potential
safety concerns associated with offshoring the production of biologic drugs to foreign companies competing on the basis of
cost, these companies might also lack the financial resources to
satisfy a large judgment if found liable for infringement subsequent to an extended at-risk product launch.
But more importantly, there are other compelling justifications for a PPRP for drugs that the FTC Report ignores, including the potential for irreversible price erosion and loss of consumer goodwill if a competing drug enters the market prior to a
determination of patent infringement. Prescription drugs, and
particularly biologic drugs, are to a large extent paid for by
third-party payers, according to complex formularies and negotiated rates of reimbursement. In this environment, an innovator unable to block initial market entry by an FOB competitor
will suffer not only lost sales, but also faces substantial and potentially irreversible price erosion and loss of goodwill. Absent
some mechanism for initiating an infringement lawsuit prior to
FOB market entry, the innovator would have no opportunity to
convince a court to grant a preliminary injunction to avert this
harm, no matter how strong the merits of the patent case might
be.
A. FOB LEGISLATION SHOULD INCLUDE A FAIR AND BALANCED
PRE-APPROVAL PATENT LITIGATION PROCESS
The issue of irreversible price erosion based on premature
market entry by a drug competitor was addressed recently by
the Federal Circuit in Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex.108 The issue
on appeal was whether the district court was justified in entering a preliminary injunction barring a company from marketing a generic version of the drug Plavix®.109 The district court
107. ROBERT J. SHAPIRO ET AL., THE POTENTIAL AMERICAN MARKET FOR
GENERIC BIOLOGICAL TREATMENTS AND THE ASSOCIATED COST SAVINGS 7
(2008), available at http://www.insmed.com/pdf/Biogeneric_Savings.pdf.
108. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
109. Id. at 1372–74.
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had determined that the market presence of the generic product would likely result in an irreversible erosion in the price
that the innovator would be able to charge for its branded
product, and that this erosion in price could not be reversed by
an injunction ordering the generic product off the market at a
later date.110 Even if the branded company were able to drive
the generic product off the market, the district court found that
third-party payers would resist going back to paying the higher
price charged prior to the entry of the generic product.111 The
court also found that the innovator would be irreversibly
harmed by loss of consumer goodwill by customers who will
grow accustomed to lower prices while the generic product is on
the market.112 On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.113
Although Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex involved a small molecule drug, the rationale behind the court’s conclusion that irreversible price reduction is likely upon market entry by a
competitor applies with equal force in the market for biologics,
where reimbursement is likewise dictated by the complex negotiated relationships between drug companies and third-party
payers eager to cut costs. Indeed, the whole point of the FOB
legislation is to create competition that will force innovators either to lower prices or to lose sales of their product to an FOB
competitor. Thus, as in the case of conventional drugs, market
entry by an FOB will often threaten irreversible damages to
the innovator owing to price erosion.
Not surprisingly, in a recent case involving a biologic drug,
the court came to a similar conclusion when faced with the
question of whether to enjoin market entry by a competing
product. In Amgen v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, the district court

110. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 317, 342–43
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 343.
113. Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1385; see also Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz,
Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d
at 1383) (affirming the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction and
stating that “erosion of markets, customers, and prices is rarely reversible”);
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingleheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court’s determination that testimony
about the likelihood of price erosion and loss of market position upon market
entry by a competing generic drug supported a finding of irreparable harm
and entry of a preliminary injunction).
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judge initially considered denying Amgen an injunction while
the case was on appeal, in the belief that the availability of a
competing biosimilar could benefit patients.114 However, upon
further reflection the judge decided to enter the injunction, concluding that even a short period of market entry by the infringing product would result in irreversible harm to the patent
owner Amgen.115 The judge also opined that the injunction benefited the “public’s interest in a robust patent system that
maintains incentives for pharmaceutical innovation.”116 The
Federal Circuit affirmed the injunction on appeal.117
Market entry by an infringing FOB could also result in loss
of goodwill for the innovator, for a variety of reasons. For example, consider a scenario where an FOB has entered the market for some period of time prior to a finding of infringement,
but is then enjoined by the court from further marketing the
product for the remainder of the patent term. It is highly foreseeable that some patients who have been using the FOB will
strongly resist being compelled to switch over to the innovator’s
product, either because of a perception that the FOB is somehow superior to the innovator product, or simply based on an
unwillingness to accept the risk that some subtle difference between the products could render the two products not entirely
interchangeable. Even if there is no scientific basis to think
that the FOB is in any way superior to the innovator product,
the innovator will be in a very difficult position if patients
plead for continued access to the FOB on humanitarian
grounds.
The recent case of Genentech v. Insmed appears to provide
an example of this phenomenon.118 The patent owner prevailed
in a patent infringement lawsuit against a competing biologic
manufacturer and obtained a consent judgment that included
an injunction requiring the infringer to exit the market.119
114. Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 160, 209–
10 (D. Mass. 2008).
115. Id. at 210, 212 (finding that market entry by a competing biologic
“would cause immense, immeasurable, irreparable harm, with the balance of
the hardships falling on [the innovator],” and would result in “lost profits,
market share, and goodwill”).
116. Id. at 210.
117. Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 296 Fed. App’x 69, 70 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
118. Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
119. Consent Judgment & Permanent Injunction, Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 4:04CV05429), 2007 WL
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However, a number of patients who had been taking the infringing product complained vociferously that the infringing
product was somehow more effective in the treatment of their
condition than the innovator’s product, and launched a petition
drive demanding availability of the infringing product in the
United States.120 Note that there appears to be no compelling
scientific basis for concluding that the infringing product is in
fact superior, but faced with patient concerns an innovator
company will often feel compelled to give in to public sentiment, regardless of the scientific merits of the case, both for
humanitarian reasons and to maintain the goodwill of patients
and doctors. In fact, faced with public pressure the patent owner, Genentech, agreed to a modified settlement permitting limited distribution of the infringing product in the United
States.121
Of course, if a competing biologic truly does have superior
properties relative to the first product to enter the market, it is
important to facilitate early patient access to the best therapeutic available. But if in fact an FOB has significant clinical
benefits compared to the original innovator product, the company producing the FOB should use the conventional FDA regulatory process to gain approval of its drug, including an FDAvalidated determination of the distinct safety and efficacy
properties of its new biologic. The purpose behind FOB legislation is to provide improved access to biosimilar molecules that
can be substituted for innovator molecules, not to provide an
abbreviated pathway for the approval of different and allegedly
superior biologics.
Economic injury to an innovator resulting from market entry by a competitor due to price erosion and loss of goodwill
might not only be irreversible, but also inadequately compensable by a post-judgment award of money damages owing to difficulties in quantifying the extent of injury. Although courts
will sometimes award a prevailing patent owner lost profit
damages, in practice, it will often prove difficult, if not impossible, for the patent owner to satisfy the high degree of proof required by courts to substantiate an award of lost profit damages. The patent owner bears the burden of establishing the

775609; Holman, Learning, supra note 68, at 233.
120. Holman, Learning, supra note 68, at 233 & n.117.
121. Id. at 233.
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amount of damages,122 and courts often require patent owners
seeking lost profit damages to provide a detailed and quantitative economic analysis to establish the amount of profits that
would have been earned in a hypothetical “but for” world in
which the infringement never occurred.123 Judge Easterbrook
has described in great detail the sorts of complex economic
analysis required to support an award of lost profit damages.124
Even if a court is convinced that the patent owner has suffered
lost profits, it will often balk at awarding lost profit damages if
unconvinced that the patent owner has marshaled “[sufficient]
evidence from which a fair determination could be made as to
the amount of profit plaintiff would have made.”125
This could prove particularly problematic for a biologic innovator that has prevailed in a patent infringement suit, but it
is unable to establish the actual amount of loss with a sufficient
degree of economic rigor to satisfy a court. As noted by the
court in Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, market entry by a competing drug is likely to result in large losses to the patent owner due to price erosion, but the specific amount can be extremely difficult to calculate with the required degree of certainty.126
There are many examples where courts have denied a prevailing patent owner lost profit damages because the court found
the amount of lost damages requested by a patent owner was
too “speculative.”127 This strict requirement of proof to establish
lost profit damages could preclude a biologic innovator from obtaining adequate compensation for lost profits.
Courts are particularly inclined to deny an award of dam-

122. See, e.g., Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d
1555, 1578–79 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that a plaintiff’s burden to establish
lost profits is a preponderance of the evidence).
123. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 127.
124. In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litigation, 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1383–85 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
125. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156
(6th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
126. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 317, 342–43
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
127. Hebert v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Damage
awards can not be based upon speculation or optimism, but must be established by evidence.”); see also King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941,
952 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reviewing application of the “but for” standard); State
Indus. v. Mor-Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (explaining requirements for awarding lost profit damages); Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that
determination of actual damages may be difficult).
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ages based on future lost profits, which could preclude adequate compensation for a biologic innovator that has suffered
irreversible losses due to the ongoing effects of price erosion
and loss of goodwill.128 This would leave the innovator with
nothing more than reasonable royalty damages, which will
generally be far lower than the actual harm caused by FOB
market entry. Clearly, it is important to provide innovators
with an opportunity to gain access to the courts to attempt to
obtain a preliminary injunction blocking market entry. This
might be the only way for a biologic innovator to ward off the
irreversible and incompensable injury resulting from market
entry by an FOB later found to be infringing.
It bears noting that none of the proposed FOB PPRPs
would include a mandatory stay of the approval of the FOB.
This is a key feature of the Hatch-Waxman PPRP, pursuant to
which FDA will impose a mandatory thirty-month stay in the
approval of a generic drug after a Paragraph IV infringement
suit is filed. In contrast, the proposed FOB PPRPs would merely provide standing for the innovator to initiate an infringement suit. To block market entry by the FOB, an innovator
would need to convince a court to enter a preliminary injunction, which would require a showing of reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits of the patent case, as well as equitable
considerations weighing in favor of injunction.129 An innovator
with a weak patent case would not be allowed to block market
entry by means of a preliminary injunction, and an FOB applicant facing an infringement suit of dubious merit would likely
not be dissuaded from entering the market once the FOB application has been approved.
B. FOB LEGISLATION LACKING A PPRP WOULD DISCRIMINATE
AGAINST COMPANIES DEVELOPING INNOVATIVE BIOLOGIC
MEDICINES
FOB legislation that fails to provide a PPRP would unjustifiably discriminate against biologic innovators in comparison
128. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming the district court’s holding that determination of
future estimated damages was speculative and reasoning that “[t]he burden of
proving future injury is commensurately greater than that for damages already incurred, for the future always harbors unknowns.”)
129. See, e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
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with small molecule innovators. In other contexts, the two
types of drug innovators have generally been afforded equivalent treatment. For example, Hatch-Waxman includes a regulatory approval exemption, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which exempts
a generic company from patent infringement liability arising
out of activities relating to generation of data for submission to
FDA.130 This exemption allows a generic company to conduct
the study necessary to secure FDA approval prior to the expiration of the innovator’s patents, and thus be poised to enter the
market immediately upon patent expiration. While this exemption limits the patent rights of the innovator, the PPRP provided under Hatch-Waxman provides balance by permitting the
innovator to bring suit prior to market entry in order to resolve
issues of infringement prior to market entry by the generic. In
conjunction, the two provisions work to ensure that generic
drugs can enter the market promptly upon patent expiration,
but that innovators have the opportunity to block generic market entry that would infringe their patents.
Subsequent court decisions have established that the regulatory approval exemption is not limited to conventional drugs,
but also shields activities relating to regulatory submissions
made in connection with the approval of a biologic product.131
Thus, FOB applicants already benefit from the regulatory approval exemption from patent infringement liability, so creation of a PPRP for FOBs would provide balance comparable to
the balance that already exists for small molecule innovators
and generic competitors.
The FTC Report seems to assume that under the current
system biologic innovators are only able to sue for patent infringement after a competing product has entered the market.
However, it is actually quite common for a biologic innovator to
bring a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of
patent infringement and an injunction blocking market entry
by a potential competitor. The courts have allowed these declaratory judgment actions to proceed based on the imminent
threat of infringement established by the potential competitor’s
application for marketing approval of its product.132 But under
130. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006).
131. See Amgen, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 565 F.3d 846, 851 (Fed. Cir.
2009); Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1095 (N.D. Cal.
2006).
132. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293,
1295–96 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 581 F.

HOLMAN_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

790

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

6/10/2010 2:51 PM

[Vol. 11:2

the current system, there is no guarantee that a court will find
the innovator has standing to bring a declaratory judgment action, and there have been cases where such actions have been
dismissed for lack of sufficient controversy to satisfy the standing requirement.133 Once an FOB applicant has applied for approval to market a competing version of an innovator’s drug,
the innovator should be able to begin proceedings to resolve patent issues, and a PPRP would provide clarity as to when an
innovator will have standing to bring such a suit.
Generic companies routinely challenge small molecule drug
patents with the expectation of having to litigate the matter
prior to market entry; this is simply part of the cost of doing
business in the industry. The FTC Report predicts that FOB
competitors will generally be well established and well-funded
biotechnology companies, the type of company that should be
able to manage the cost of commencing litigation of patents
prior to market entry.134 If they are not, they could be the type
of judgment-proof company which the FTC Report would find to
justify the availability of a PPRP. A PPRP that does not automatically stay approval of the allegedly infringing product
would not block FOB market entry unless a court determines
that there is a substantial likelihood that the patent owner will
ultimately prevail, thus ensuring that biologic innovators will
not be able to game the PPRP by filing a non-meritorious infringement lawsuit merely as a tactic to delay market entry.
IV. AN EXCHANGE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
WILL BE NECESSARY TO ASSESS INFRINGEMENT AND
SHOULD NOT CREATE AN UNDUE OR UNIQUE RISK OF
COLLUSION
Because of the complex nature of biologics and biologic
production, and the heavy reliance of biologic innovators on patents relating to the processes and technologies used to produce
the product, it will be necessary for the innovator to have some
access to information about the specific nature of the proposed
FOB product and production process in order to assess whether
infringement would occur. Proposed FOB legislation would in-

Supp. 2d 160, 166, 229 (D. Mass. 2008).
133. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F.Supp.2d
104, 111–13 (D. Mass. 1998).
134. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 53.
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clude various provisions governing the exchange of confidential
information, as well as provisions designed to limit access to
the confidential information. In spite of these provisions to
maintain confidentiality of proprietary information, the FTC
Report voices concern that these safeguards will be insufficient
to prevent an unreasonable likelihood that the data exchange
could lead to collusion between the innovator and FOB companies.135 However, without this information it will be difficult in
many cases for an innovator to assess whether an FOB product
would infringe its patent. This is particularly true since, unlike
a generic version of a drug, an FOB product could differ substantially from the innovator product and be produced using a
very different process.
The FTC’s concerns regarding the potential for collusion
are probably overstated. Litigation, particularly litigation involving technology and intellectual property, often requires
some exchange of information between representatives of competing companies, and methods have been created for minimizing the anticompetitive potential of these exchanges. For example, some generic drug patent litigation involves patents
claiming specific formulations or processes used in drug production, and resolution of these cases necessarily requires some
exchange of information between the competing companies’ attorneys.
Even if there is no PPRP for biologics, biologic innovators
will often be able to bring declaratory judgment actions to establish that marketing of the FOB would be infringing, and
even if denied standing in a declaratory judgment action, they
still will be able to bring an infringement lawsuit once the FOB
enters the market. This type of litigation will likewise necessitate some exchange of information, but there are safeguards
that can be used to minimize the danger that this exchange of
data will result in collusion. In recent years, the FTC has closely scrutinized the activities of both generic and branded drug
companies, and particularly their interactions with each other,
and should be able to continue to do so, thus minimizing the potential for anticompetitive collusion. In any event, the FTC has
failed to articulate any rational basis for thinking that the exchange of information that would occur as part of a PPRP for
biologics raises a unique potential for collusion that does not
already exist with respect to the PPRP for conventional drugs,
135. Id. at 58.
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and with non-PPRP patent litigation in the pharmaceutical industry and beyond.
V. PPRP PROVISIONS THAT WOULD COMPEL
INNOVATORS TO IDENTIFY AND ASSERT PATENTS
PRIOR TO FOB APPROVAL ARE UNNECESSARY,
DISCRIMINATORY, AND WOULD WEAKEN INCENTIVES
FOR INNOVATION
Some of the proposals, particularly House Bill 1427, include provisions that would seek to compel a biologic innovator
to identify all patents that might be infringed by an FOB, and
to assert those patents in a lawsuit against an FOB applicant
prior to FOB marketing approval.136 Failure to identify a patent or to assert it in a timely manner would result in draconian penalties for the innovator. These heavy-handed attempts
to compel an innovator to bring a lawsuit prior to FOB marketing approval are unjustified, and would hurt innovation by severely degrading the value of patents held by innovators.
The provision requiring innovators to identify patents that
could be infringed by an FOB are unfair and unnecessary. As
noted in the FTC Report, patent information is freely available
in the public domain, and an FOB applicant will have ample
opportunity to identify and address relevant issued patents.137
It is important to remember that by entering the market an
FOB producer will be subject to lawsuits not only by the innovator, but by third parties owning patents allegedly covering
the FOB, or processes and technologies used in manufacturing
it. These sorts of third-party patent infringement lawsuits,
which do not involve direct market competitors, are quite common in the context of biologic drugs. This is not surprising in
view of the large number of complex technologies used in the
development and manufacturing of biologics, and the large
number of patents covering these technologies and owned by
dispersed parties.
The threat of being sued for patent infringement after
market entry is a simple reality that any biologic producer faces, and that also applies to FOB producers. For a variety of reasons, some of which were addressed in the FTC Report,138 it
136. H.R. 1427, 111th Cong. (2009).
137. See FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 30–31.
138. See id. at 59–60.
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would be entirely impractical and unwise to attempt to force all
third-party patent owners to identify patents that might be infringed by an FOB, and to bring a lawsuit prior to the marketing approval of FOB. At the same time, it makes no sense to
discriminate against biologic innovators by requiring them to
bring suit early but not requiring the same of other third-party
patent owners. Thus, any PPRP provisions enacted for biologics
should not include any provisions that would seek to compel biologic innovators to identify potentially infringing patents, or to
bring suit prior to FOB marketing approval or risk loss of patent rights. This would be consistent with the PPRP process
currently available for conventional drug innovators, which
contains no provision that would force an innovator to choose
between bringing suit immediately or forfeiting the ability to
obtain sufficient remedies for patent infringement later.139
Not only are provisions compelling innovators to identify
and assert patents prior to FOB marketing approval unnecessary, they also discriminate against biologic innovators compared to conventional drug innovators. These provisions would
dramatically weaken the patent rights of biologic innovators,
which would result in reduced investment and innovation in biologics.
A. HATCH-WAXMAN STRIVES TO BALANCE THE INTERESTS OF
INNOVATORS AND GENERIC COMPANIES
To better appreciate the harshness of some aspects of the
PPRP provisions currently being considered by Congress, it is
instructive to first consider the relatively balanced approach
embodied in the Hatch-Waxman PPRP. Under Hatch-Waxman,
an innovator marketing an approved conventional drug is required to list all of its patents that claim the drug, or a method
of using the drug, in an FDA publication known as the Orange
Book.140 The Orange Book listing requirement only applies to
drugs regulated under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA),141 and thus does not apply to most biologic drugs,
which are regulated under the Public Health Services Act
(PHSA).142 Listing a patent in the Orange Book not only pro139. See id. at 49-50; see also Holman, Reverse Payments, supra note 25, at
509–16 (2007) (explaining PPRP for conventional drugs under HatchWaxman).
140. See id. at 49.
141. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399a (2006).
142. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300jj-38 (2006).
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vides notice to potential generic competitors of the most relevant patents, but also effectively puts a bounty on each of the
listed patents, in the form of a 180-day period of generic exclusivity that is granted to any generic company that challenges
an Orange Book-listed patent by applying for approval to commence marketing of the generic version prior to patent expiration.143 The generic company must specifically allege that the
challenged patent is invalid or would not be infringed by the
company’s proposed generic product. During these 180 days,
FDA will not authorize the marketing of any other generic version of the drug, a boon for the generic company and a substantial financial incentive for patent challenges.
Orange Book listing also provides substantial benefit to the
patent owner. FDA will not approve a generic version of a drug
until all of the Orange Book-listed patents relating to the drug
have expired, unless the generic applicant explicitly challenges
a patent as described above. If a generic company does challenge an Orange Book-listed patent, Hatch-Waxman authorizes
the patent owner to immediately file an infringement lawsuit
before the proposed generic product has been approved for
marketing. If suit is filed within forty-five days, the statute
specifies that FDA will not approve the generic application for
at least thirty months.144 In effect, Orange Book listing allows
the patent owner to obtain an automatic preliminary injunction
of at least thirty months, blocking generic market entry without having to establish the reasonable expectation of success
and other equitable factors normally necessary to convince a
court to grant a preliminary injunction.145 Ideally, the thirty
months provides the parties an opportunity to resolve patent
issues prior to generic market entry.
The benefits of Orange Book listing for innovators tend to
balance other provisions of Hatch-Waxman that worked as a
disadvantage, such as the regulatory approval exemption from
patent infringement that permits generic companies to conduct
the tests necessary to achieve FDA approval prior to the expiration of the innovator’s patents. Another substantial benefit to
generic companies is the abbreviated approval process which
allows them to gain marketing approval based on data generat-

143. Holman, Reverse Payments, supra note 25, at 509–16 (2007).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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ed and submitted by the innovator, and also permits FDA to
authorize pharmacists to substitute the generic drug for a
branded drug prescribed by a physician.
B. SOME OF THE PROPOSED PPRP PROVISIONS DEVIATE
DRAMATICALLY FROM THE BALANCED APPROACH EMBODIED IN
HATCH-WAXMAN
In stark contrast with the balanced approach of HatchWaxman, House Bill 1427 would create a PPRP weighted heavily against the patent owner. Under House Bill 1427, any applicant or prospective applicant for approval of an FOB would be
authorized to demand from any innovator marketing an approved biologic a list of all patents owned, licensed or controlled
by the innovator, that could potentially be infringed by a followon product.146 This request could be made at any time, long before an FOB application is submitted, and even if an application is never submitted.147 Not only would the innovator be required to identify patents claiming the biologic drug and
methods of using it, but also components of the drug and
processes that could be used to produce the product, regardless
of whether or not the patented process is actually used in the
production of the innovator’s product. In other words, the innovator would not only be required to identify product-specific patents, but any patent covering a process or reagent which could
conceivably be adapted for use in the production of a biosimilar
product. To ensure innovator compliance, House Bill 1427
would punish the failure to list any patent by rendering that
patent unenforceable, not only against the FOB applicant but
against the whole world.148
Facing the draconian threat of patent unenforceability, and
uncertainty as to the range of potential variation that would be
permitted under the nebulous concept of “biosimilarity,” innovators will likely feel compelled to err on the side of overinclusion and list any patent that could conceivably be related to the
production of a biosimilar product. Unfortunately for the innovator, however, listing a patent will subject that patent to a
number of provisions of House Bill 1427 that dramatically limit
the rights of the patent owner. For example, once a patent has
been identified in such a list, House Bill 1427 would bar the pa-

146. H.R. 1427, 111th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2009).
147. See id.
148. Id. at § 3(b)(2).
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tent owner from bringing a pre-marketing declaratory judgment lawsuit against the FOB applicant, forcing the innovator
to wait until the FOB has entered the market at risk before
commencing a lawsuit for infringement.149 In the past, innovators have used declaratory judgment actions to bring suit prior
to market entry by the competitor. Such declaratory judgment
actions provide patent owners an opportunity to plead their
case before a court, and to obtain a preliminary injunction that
prevents the competing product from being launched until the
litigation is resolved. Importantly, a court will not issue a preliminary injunction unless it is convinced that the patent owner
is likely to prevail in its lawsuit, and that the public interest is
not adversely affected by the injunction.150 By barring the innovator from bringing suit until after the FOB has entered the
market at risk, House Bill 1427 substantially weakens the patent rights of the innovator.
While innovators would be blocked from bringing a declaratory judgment action with respect to any listed patent, House
Bill 1427 explicitly authorizes an FOB applicant to bring a declaratory judgment lawsuit alleging invalidity or noninfringement of any of the listed patents at any time.151 The bill would
allow an FOB applicant to challenge any patent any time prior
to approval and marketing, or to decide not to challenge any
patent and enter the market at risk, while denying the patent
owner any corresponding right to bring an action prior to market entry.
Not only does House Bill 1427 provide a unilateral right to
an FOB applicant to bring a declaratory judgment action prior
to marketing approval, it also provides an alternate mechanism
for challenging a patent without bringing suit. Under the bill,
an FOB applicant can, at any time, provide notice to the innovator alleging that one or more of the innovators’ patents is either invalid or would not be infringed by the FOB product.152

149. Id. at § 3(a)(2).
150. Am. Signature, Inc. v. United States, 598 F.3d 816, 823 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374
(2008)) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish (1) that
he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.”)
151. Id. at § 3(a)(2).
152. Id.
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The innovator would then have to bring in infringement suit
within forty-five days.153 If a lawsuit is not filed in time, the innovator will be barred from asserting the patent in court until
the FOB product is on the market. And as punishment for not
bringing suit within the forty-five day window, House Bill 1427
would forever limit the innovator’s remedy for patent infringement to reasonable royalty damages, even if the innovator ultimately prevails in court and proves that the FOB product infringes a valid patent.154 The more potent remedies that are
available to any other patent holder—a permanent injunction
to prevent ongoing or impending infringement, lost profit damages to adequately compensate the innovator, and enhanced
damages for willful infringement—would be unavailable for biologic innovators. In effect, failure to file suit within forty-five
days would result in a compulsory license of the patent in favor
of the FOB applicant.
As alluded to in the FTC Report, in many cases forty-five
days will be insufficient time for the patent owner to thoroughly assess the merits of a patent infringement suit.155 Compounding the problem, there is nothing to prevent an FOB applicant from changing its production process, and consequently
the nature of the product, after the forty-five days have expired.156 Thus, an innovator might decide not to bring suit
within forty-five days because of its understanding of the proposed product and process, but subsequent changes to the production process could change the nature not only of the process
but of the product itself, thereby rendering it infringing. Even
so, the innovator’s remedies will be limited to reasonable royalties as determined by a court, which will likely fall short of
adequate compensation for the innovator. The FTC Report
notes that FOB applicants would be incentivized to engage in
this sort of gamesmanship.157
House Bill 1427 also includes a change of venue provision
that authorizes an FOB applicant that has been sued for patent
infringement to request that the court transfer the action to
another judicial district.158 This provision would only operate in
one direction, since no complementary right is provided to in153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id. at § 3(b)(2).
FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 52 n.219.
Id. at 55.
FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 54 n.225.
H.R. 1427, at § 3(b)(1).
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novators to seek a change of venue in a declaratory judgment
action filed by an FOB applicant. When considering a request
for change of venue under the bill, the greatest weight would be
placed on moving the case to a district court which will adjudicate the matter promptly so that the FOB product can be
launched as quickly as possible.159 Any other considerations
would be secondary. By depriving innovators of any meaningful
control over the venue in which to enforce their patent rights,
the bill further weakens the patent rights of innovators relative
to any other participants in the patent system.
Unlike its predecessor, House Bill 1548,160 the PPRP provisions of the House Amendment do not include such discriminatory measures. To be sure, the House and Senate Amendments
are largely similar and follow the same general structure. In
both, the acceptance of a biologics license application for abbreviated approval triggers an obligation to provide reference
product sponsors and certain patent owners with confidential
access to the FOB application and information about the FOB
manufacturing process.161 The burden of identifying relevant
patents then falls largely on the reference product sponsor or
the patent owner. Relevant patents include product and method-of-use patents with respect to which a claim of infringement could reasonably be asserted, as well as manufacturing
and process patents and patents to biological starting materials
and intermediates. Because the PPRP is tied to the submission
of an FOB application, the earliest date under which litigation
could commence under both Amendments is during year four
after first licensure of the reference product.162 Before preapproval patent litigation can commence, the parties exchange
detailed statements concerning the infringement, validity and
enforceability of the identified patents. A statement by the FOB

159. Id.
160. H.R. 1548, 111th Cong. (2009).
161. Note that House Bill 1427 follows a different pattern, which was discussed in more detail in previous sections of this paper. See H.R. 1427. This
section focuses on what appears to be a developing consensus view, as embodied in House Bill 1548 and the recent House and Senate Amendments. See
H.R. 1548.
162. The House and Senate Amendments, as well as House Bill 1548 and
Senate Bill 1695, each provide that the earliest date on which an FOB application may be submitted is on the fourth anniversary of the date the reference
product was first licensed by FDA. See H.R. 1548, at § 101(a); S. 1695, 110th
Cong. § 2(a) (as introduced in the Senate, June 26, 2007).
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applicant that an identified patent would not be infringed, is
invalid, or unenforceable, triggers a limited window within
which the plaintiff can bring a patent infringement suit.163 Patent litigation that is concluded before data exclusivity expires,
and that results in a finding of infringement, will operate to delay the effective date of the FOB approval until the expiration
of the infringed patent. Thus, on the simplest level, the House
and Senate Amendments both contemplate that the submission
of an FOB application would open a time window for patent litigation long before the FOB application would be approved by
the FDA, without the need for special stays of FDA approval
pending litigation. Patents would be litigated to a final decision
within this window, thus providing patent certainty for both
parties and a date certain at which the FOB product could be
launched.
Despite these many similarities, the PPRP provisions of
the Senate Amendment are also related to those provided in
House Bill 1427, albeit not quite as draconian. Unlike the
House Amendment, the Senate Amendment would limit an innovator to reasonable royalties for not promptly filing a lawsuit
once an FOB applicant challenged the patent. It would also punish an innovator for failing to identify a relevant patent by
rendering the patent unenforceable with respect to the biological product at issue, which is at least an improvement over
House Bill 1427, which would render the patent totally unenforceable against the world. Still, the threat is so severe that an
innovator will be effectively compelled to list any patent that
could conceivably be infringed by an FOB.
These provisions clearly discriminate against biologic innovators. In no other area of technology is a patent owner required to identify patents that it thinks might be infringed,
particularly with respect to a product that might still be
changed prior to market entry. Patent owners are not ordinarily compelled to choose between immediately bringing a lawsuit
against a competitor, to say nothing of a potential competitor
perhaps years from market entry, or being limited to reasonable royalty damages (which, in effect, amount to a compulsory
163. The Senate Amendment provides that this statement would constitute
an “act of infringement” - the formal basis for bringing an infringement lawsuit. The House Amendment currently does not contain this necessary provision, possibly due to a technical omission. Note that this provision was properly included in House Bill 1548, the predecessor to the House Amendment. See
H.R. 1548, at § 101(a).

HOLMAN_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

800

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

6/10/2010 2:51 PM

[Vol. 11:2

license of the technology). Conventional drug innovators do not
face this burden, nor do third-party patent owners who do not
make the reference product but nonetheless have patents relating to the production of the FOB. In this sense, these provisions
favor the non-practicing entity over the innovator who invests
in bringing an actual product to market. This is inconsistent
with the more general trend in patent law that favors parties
who actually commercialize their patented technology over nonpracticing entities.164
VI. CONCLUSION
Any abbreviated approval pathway for FOBs should include a substantial data exclusivity period and a fair mechanism for the early resolution of patent disputes. The pending
proposals vary widely in many regards, including the patent
provisions. Several of the proposals would impose unduly complex procedures and exceedingly unfair burden and risk on biotech innovators. This stands in contrast to the patent laws governing all other technologies. Such an approach is also inconsistent with the relatively balanced mechanism adopted for the
generic drug regime established by the Hatch-Waxman Act and
is unwarranted in the biotechnology context where the challenges of getting a new medicine to patients are even greater.

164. See EBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).

